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TWO-PLAYER INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE OUTCOME FUNCTIONS
ARE AFFINE MAXIMIZERS
BO LIN AND NGOC MAI TRAN
Abstract. In mechanism design, for a given type space, there may be incentive compatible
outcome functions which are not affine maximizers. Using tools from linear algebra and
tropical geometry, we prove that for two-player games on a discrete type space, any given
outcome function can be turned into an affine maximizer through a nontrivial perturbation
of the type space. Furthermore, our theorems are the strongest possible in this setup.
1. Introduction
Mechanisms are engineered games, devised to implement social choice functions in an
economy where the players are rational, act in their own interests, and make decisions based
on private information called their type. A special case is single-item auction, where the
players are bidders, a player’s type is what they truly think the good on sales is worth, and a
desirable social choice function could be the one that would assign the good to the person who
values it the most, for example. In general, mechanism design encompasses much broader
setups. The theory is rich and fundamental to game theory, economics and computer science
[16, 26]. However, even in the simplest case, some fundamental questions remain open. This
paper concerns one such problem, namely, how far is the set of incentive compatible outcomes
from the set of affine maximizers in a discrete type space.
Throughout this paper, we consider the simplest setup of deterministic, dominant strategy
incentive compatible (IC) mechanisms on m outcomes and n players. This means the follow-
ing. The game can take one of m ≥ 1 (finitely many) possible outcomes. There are n ≥ 1
players, each has a true type ti ∈ Rm, known only to them, where tij is how much player i
values outcome j. The mechanism designer does not see the true types. Instead, she sees the
individual type spaces T 1, . . . , T n, where each T i is an ordered tuple of points in Rm that
contains the true type of the i-th player. The designer needs to choose a mechanism (g, p),
which consists of an outcome function g : T := T 1×· · ·×T n → [m], together with a payment
function p : T → Rn. Given a mechanism (g, p), the game works as follows. Each player
declares a type (which may or may not be their true type), and based on that declared type
s = (s1, . . . , sn) in T , the game outcome is g(s), and player i ∈ [n] needs to pay p(s)i to the
designer. When the players declare s in T , the profit of player i is tig(s) − p(s)i. The players
are assumed to be rational, which means that given other players’ declared types, player i
will choose to declare u in T i that maximizes her profit. This u may or may not be her
true type. The mechanism is incentive compatible in dominant strategy, abbreviated (IC),
if: for every player i, declaring her true type would maximize her profit, regardless of what
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the others declare. That is, for each fixed s = (s1, . . . , si−1, ti, si+1, . . . sn), for all u ∈ T i,
(1) tig(s) − p(s)i ≥ t
i
g(s1,...,si−1,u,si+1,...,sn) − p(s
1, . . . , si−1, u, si+1, . . . , sn)i.
Incentive compatible mechanisms are simple and strategy proof, and thus encourage a more
transparent and efficient economy.
A fundamental problem in mechanism design is to characterize all possible IC mechanisms
on a given type space T . For single-player mechanisms (where n = 1), there are multiple
characterizations [26]. For example, it is the set of all covectors corresponding to cells in the
tropical polytope of T [7]. However, when n ≥ 2, the problem remains wide open, except for
a handful of special cases [2, 17]. One particular subset of multi-player IC outcome functions
heavily studied is the set of affine maximizers. Affine maximizers are tractable precisely
because they can be handled using techniques from the single-player case. However, generally
they form a strict subset of all possible IC outcome functions on T . There are very few spaces
where all IC outcome functions are affine maximizers. The first result in this direction is
Roberts’ Theorem [24], which states that if T i = Rm for all i, then all IC outcome functions
are affine maximizers. Since then, much efforts have been put in understanding and extending
Roberts’ Theorem, often to rather specific type spaces [5, 10, 12, 18, 21, 26], see [20] for a
recent overview of this literature.
Our paper takes a novel view on Roberts’ Theorem and its successors. Instead of looking
for type spaces where all IC outcome functions are affine maximizers, we seek to quantify
how large is the latter set relative to the former. Specifically, we ask: is a given IC outcome
function g on an n-player type space T = T 1 × · · · × T n an affine maximizer on some type
space S = S1×· · ·×Sn, where IC(T ) and IC(S), the sets of IC outcome functions on T and
S respectively, differ as little as possible? In other words, can one perturb the type space
slightly to include a given IC outcome function g in its set of affine maximizers? Call this
the perturbed Roberts’ problem.
Type space perturbation has appeared in the context of robust mechanism design [3, 4, 6,
23]. Though the context is different, we share a common purpose with this literature, namely,
to produce theorems in mechanism design that hold for even when the underlying type space is
slightly disturbed through numerical roundings or arbitrary noise perturbations. Such results
are especially important for practical applications such as auctions, where the player’s true
valuation of the object can only be approximated to start with. Another compelling reason
to measure the gap between affine maximizers and all IC outcome functions rests in the main
challenge of mechanism design: to find mechanisms which are optimal according to some
criterion, for instance, manipulation-free or maximizes revenue. In these cases, one would
like to know whether optimizing over all affine maximizers is very far from optimizing over
all IC outcome functions [11, 17]. In this view, the perturbed Roberts’ problem is a measure
of the approximability of IC outcome functions by affine maximizers.
The exact result on the perturbed Roberts’ problem depends on how much IC(S) is al-
lowed to differ from IC(T ). Under the tropical geometry view of mechanism design, for the
single-player case, IC(T ) is a topological constraint on the tropical hyperplane arrangements
formed by T [22]. Clearly approximation is easier but less interesting when the topological
constraint is less rigid. Thus finding the strongest constraint where approximation still holds
is particularly interesting. The main result of our paper, Theorem 1.1 is such a positive
approximation result. Theorems 1.2 and 1.3 show that approximability dramatically fails
under various relaxations of the constraints in Theorem 1.1, thus proving that the result we
obtained is the strongest possible in these settings.
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Theorem 1.1 (Two-player, one fixed type, one outcome function). Let T = T 1 × · · · × T n
be a finite type space on n players and m ≥ 1 outcomes. Write S = S1 × · · · × Sn. Under
the constraints n = 2 and S1 = T 1, for any g ∈ IC(T 1 × T 2), there exists a type space S2
such that g is an affine maximizer on S = T 1 × S2.
Theorem 1.2. None of the constraints in Theorem 1.1 can be relaxed. In other words, there
exist type spaces T where the following versions of the perturbed Roberts’ problem have no
solution.
(i) For n ≥ 3, find S such that g is an affine maximizer on S and IC(S1) = IC(T 1).
(ii) For n ≥ 2, find S such that g is an affine maximizer on S and IC(S) = IC(T ).
(iii) For n ≥ 2, find S such that for any pair g, h ∈ IC(T ), g and h are both affine
maximizers on S and IC(S1) = IC(T 1).
We remark that the constraints imposed in Theorem 1.1 are non-trivial. The given outcome
function g is determined by T , so g being an affine maximizer on S means that S2 must satisfy
some of the inequalities and equalities as those satisfied by T 2. Thus S2 cannot be trivial.
The three cases in Theorem 1.2 correspond to various generalizations of Theorem 1.1. Case
(i) allows three or more players and S1 to be different from T 1, as long as they have the
same set of IC outcome functions. Case (ii) requires that the set of IC outcome functions
in the second player must also match up, that is, IC(S2) = IC(T 2). Case (iii) requires that
the same type space can be chosen for two different IC outcome functions g and h. Theorem
1.2 shows that without further constraints, all of these possible extensions of Theorem 1.1
do not hold. Thus, Theorem 1.1 is the strongest possible in this setup.
Our second major result explores neutral outcome functions in two-player games with
identical type spaces, that is, T 1 = T 2 and g is symmetric. This setup is particularly
interesting in applications, for it means that the mechanism respects the player’s anonymity.
Theorem 1.1 implies that one can choose a type space S = S1 × S2 such that g is an affine
maximizer on S and IC(S1) = IC(T 1). One may ask if one can further require S1 = S2. The
answer is affirmative only if one drops the assumption that IC(S1) = IC(T 1).
Theorem 1.3. There exists T 1 and symmetric g ∈ IC(T 1, T 1) such that for any S1 ∈ Rr×m
with IC(S1) = IC(T 1), we have that g is not an affine maximizer on S = S1 × S1.
Our proof technique builds on a theorem of tropical geometry that relates IC(T 1) to the
tropical determinant of the minors of the matrix T 1. In economics term, this theorem states
that revealing the set of IC outcomes on an individual type space (without specifying the type
space itself) is equivalent to revealing the player’s preference orders when only a subset of
the type space and outcomes is available. This theorem is the matching field characterization
of tropical hyperplane arrangements [13, Theorem 4.4, Example 4.6], [15], which dates back
to classical results in discrete geometry [1, 14, 25]. In our paper, it plays a crucial role in
establishing the equalities between the set of IC outcome functions in S1 and T 1 in Theorem
1.1. Furthermore, it gives intuition on the intricate construction used to prove Theorem 1.2.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief introduction to mechanism
design via tropical geometry and provide some examples to illustrate Theorem 1.1. This
approach was first described in [7]. For a comprehensive introduction to either topic, we
recommend [26] for mechanism design, and [19] for tropical geometry. In Section 3, we
present the definitions and tools needed for the proofs. We prove Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 in
Section 4, and conclude with discussions and open questions in Section 5.
4 BO LIN AND NGOC MAI TRAN
Notation. For an integer m, let [m] = {1, 2, . . . , m}. Fixing m, let 0 be the zero vector in
R
m. For an outcome function g : T := T 1×· · ·×T n → [m], since each T i is ordered, we also
denote g by a r1 × r2 × · · · × rn-tensor with entries in [m]. In particular, g becomes a vector
in [m]r1 when n = 1, and g becomes a matrix in [m]r1×r2 when n = 2. Given type spaces T i
with type matrices T i ∈ Rri×m, and for constants α1, α2, . . . , αn > 0 and a vector γ ∈ R
m,
we define another type space M(α1T
1, . . . , αnT
n, γ) as follows: it is an ordered tuple with∏n
i=1 ri entries, where the (i1, i2, . . . , in)-th entry is the vector
(2) α1T
1
i1
+ · · ·+ αnT
n
in
+ γ ∈ Rm,
for 1 ≤ ij ≤ rj, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, and the entries are ordered lexicographically.
2. Background
2.1. Background on mechanism design. First we collect relevant notations and defini-
tions from mechanism design. Consider a game with m ∈ N outcomes and n ∈ N play-
ers. For i = 1, . . . , n, the type space of a single player i is an ordered tuple T i with ri
entries where each entry is a vector in Rm. The multi-player type space T is the Carte-
sian product T := T 1 × · · · × T n. A mechanism (g, p) on the type space T consists of a
function g : T → [m] and a payment function p : T → Rn. Suppose player i has true
type ti in T i. The mechanism (g, p) is incentive compatible (IC) if for all i, (1) holds.
An outcome function g is incentive compatible if there exists a payment function p such
that (g, p) is IC. An outcome function g is called an affine maximizer on T if there exist
weights α1, . . . , αn > 0, a constant vector γ ∈ R
m, and a single-player IC outcome function
h : M(α1T
1, . . . , αnT
n, γ) → [m] such that g(t1, . . . , tn) = h(α1t
1 + · · · + αnt
n + γ) for all
(t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ T . Let IC(T 1, . . . , T n) ⊆ [m]
∏n
i=1 ri denote the set of all IC outcome func-
tions on T , and AM(T 1, . . . , T n) denote the set of all affine maximizers on T . The type
matrix of T is the matrix T ∈ Rr×m, where the row vectors of T are the entries of T listed
in the same order as T .
In a single player game (n = 1), we shall drop the superscript 1 in all notations. In this
case, a classical result in mechanism design [26, §3] states that (g, p) is IC on T if and only
if there exists a function q : [m]→ Rn such that
p = q ◦ g.
Following the convention of this literature, in this case, we call q the payment function and
denote it by p. Then (1) becomes
(3) tg(t) − p(g(t)) ≥ tg(s) − p(g(s))
for all pairs s, t ∈ T . Note that g is defined on the r entries in T and its values are in [m],
so for convenience we also write g as a vector in [m]r.
2.2. Mechanism design via tropical geometry. The tropical min-plus algebra (R ∪
{∞},⊕,⊙) is defined by a⊕b := min(a, b), a⊙ b := a + b. For a point p ∈ Rm, j ∈ [m], the
min-plus tropical hyperplane with apex p, denoted H(p), is the set of z ∈ Rm such that the
minimum in the tropical inner product
(4) (−p)⊤⊙z = min{z1 − p1, . . . , zm − pm}
is achieved at least twice. We can similarly define the tropical max-plus algebra by replacing
∞ with −∞; ⊕ with ⊕; min(a, b) with max(a, b). For J ⊆ [m], the J closed sector HJ(p)
of H(p) is the set of z ∈ Rm such that the minimum in (4) is achieved at all j ∈ J . When
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J = {j} is a singleton, we also write Hj for HJ . The collection of non-empty sectors
(HJ(p) 6= ∅ : J ⊆ [m]) partitions R
m into a classical polyhedral complex. The tropical
hyperplane arrangement based on T , denoted H(T ) is the intersection of the polyhedral
complexes formed by the closed sectors of the tropical hyperplanes (H(ti) : i = 1, . . . , r). A
vector h ∈ [m]r is called a covector of H(T ) if there exists z ∈ Rm such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
z ∈ Hh(i)(t
i).
In other words, j = h(i) attains the minimum of zj − t
i
j among 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The key
connection between mechanism design and tropical geometry is the following [7, Theorem 1].
Proposition 2.1. The set of covectors of H(T ) is IC(T ).
We exploit Proposition 2.1 here as a powerful visualization technique. Since one can
visualize H(T ) for m = 3 in R2, this gives an easy way to list out all IC outcome functions
on an individual type space T , as demonstrated in Example 2.3 below.
Example 2.2 (Visualization of IC outcome functions with tropical hyperplane arrange-
ments). Let r1 = r2 = 3 and m = 3. Define
T 1 =

0 2 30 4 2
0 3 7

 , T 2 =

0 5 −50 −2 9
0 1 3

 .
Here T 1 is the type matrix of the type space T 1 = ((0, 2, 3), (0, 4, 2), (0, 3, 7)) ∈
(
R
3
)3
.
Similarly, T 2 is the type matrix of T 2 = ((0, 5,−5), (0,−2, 9), (0, 1, 3)) ∈
(
R
3
)3
. Under the
map (x0, x1, x2) ∈ R
3 7→ (x1 − x0, x2 − x0) ∈ R
2, Figure 1 shows the tropical hyperplane
H(t13) = H(0, 3, 7) together with the three closed sectors H1(t
1
3),H2(t
1
3) and H3(t
1
3), shaded
as a visual guide. Figure 1(b) and (c) shows the tropical hyperplane arrangements H(T 1)
and H(T 2) and covectors corresponding to the open, full-dimensional cells, unshaded for
simplicity.
Now consider a mechanism g : T 1 × T 2 → [3], represented as the following matrix
g =

2 1 12 1 2
3 3 3

 .
This means g(t11, t
2
3) is the (1, 3) entry of the matrix, which is 1, for example. One can check,
using Figure 1, that the columns of g are covectors of T 1. This means for each t2 ∈ T 2,
g(·, t2) : T 1 → [3] is IC. Similarly, the rows of g are covectors of T 2. This means for each
t1 ∈ T 1, g(t1, ·) : T 2 → [3] is IC. Therefore, by definition, g is a two-player IC outcome
function on T 1 × T 2.
Example 2.3 (A demonstration of Theorem 1.1). Continue from Example 2.2, we saw that
g ∈ IC(T 1, T 2). However, we claim that g /∈ AM(T 1, T 2). Suppose there exist α1, α2 > 0
and γ ∈ R such that g ∈ IC(M(α1T
1, α2T
2, γ)). Then by Lemma 3.8, there exists z ∈ R3
such that for 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ 3 and k 6= g(i, j),
α1T
1
i,g(i,j) + α2T
2
j,g(i,j) + γ − zg(i,j) ≥ α1T
1
i,k + α2T
2
j,k + γ − zk.
So we have
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t13
H1(t
1
3)
H2(t
1
3)
H3(t
1
3)
(113)(123)
(223)
(323)
(333)
(313)
(111)
(121)
(122)
(222)
t11
t12
t13
(211)(212)
(333)
(233)
(232)
(222)
(231) (131)
(133)
(111)
t21
t22
t23
Figure 1. Figures accompany Example 2.2. From left to right: the tropical
hyperplane at t13 and its three closed sectors H1(t
1
3),H2(t
1
3) and H3(t
1
3); the
tropical hyperplane arrangement H(T 1) and the tropical hyperplane arrange-
ment H(T 2), respectively, together with the covectors corresponding to their
full-dimensional cells. Figures are drawn to scale, but the coordinates are not
shown for simplicity.
z1 − z2 ≥ −2α1 − 5α2 (i = 1, j = 1, g(i, j) = 2, k = 1);(5)
z3 − z1 ≥ 3α1 + 9α2 (i = 1, j = 2, g(i, j) = 1, k = 3);(6)
z2 − z1 ≥ 4α1 − 2α2 (i = 2, j = 2, g(i, j) = 1, k = 2);(7)
z2 − z3 ≥ −4α1 + 10α2 (i = 3, j = 1, g(i, j) = 3, k = 2).(8)
But 3(5) + (6)+ 2(7)+ (8) gives 0 ≥ α1, a contradiction! So g /∈ AM(T
1, T 2). This means
g /∈ IC(M(α1T
1, α2T
2, γ)) for any positive constants α1, α2 > 0 and γ ∈ R
3. Figure 2 (left)
gives a visual proof that g /∈ IC(M(T 1, T 2, 0)).
By Theorem 1.1, there exists another pair of type spaces S1,S2 such that IC(S1) = IC(T 1),
and g ∈ AM(S1,S2). In this example, we can take S1 = T 1, and let S2 be the type space
with type matrix
S2 =

0 5 4.30 −2 0.5
0 1 3

 .
For convenience, we let C be the type spaceM(T 1, T 2, 0) and C′ be the type spaceM(T 1,S2, 0).
Then the type matrix C (C ′) of C (C′) is a 9× 3 matrix whose (i, j)-th row is the sum of the
i-th row of T 1 and the j-th row of T 2 (S2). Figure 2 (right) shows that g ∈ IC(C′) and thus
g ∈ AM(S1,S2).
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C1,1
C1,2
C1,3
C2,1
C2,2
C2,3
C3,1
C3,2
C3,3
C ′1,1
C ′1,2
C ′1,3
C ′2,1
C ′2,2
C ′2,3
C ′3,1
C ′3,2
C ′3,3
Figure 2. The left figure is the hyperplane arrangement obtained from C =
M(T 1, T 2, 0) for T 1, T 2 in Example 2.2. Here Ci,j = t
1
i + t
2
j for i, j = 1, . . . 3.
Note that the closed sectors H1(t
1
1 + t
2
2) and H3(t
1
3 + t
2
1) are disjoint, and thus
no h ∈ IC(C) can simultaneously have h(1, 2) = 1 and h(3, 1) = 3, while
g(1, 2) = 1 and g(3, 1) = 3. Therefore, g /∈ IC(C). The right figure shows that
g ∈ IC(C′) as the shaded sector has cell type g - for any point p in the closed
shaded sector and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3, p ∈ Hg(i,j)(t
1
i + t
2
j).
3. Type spaces and incentive compatible outcome functions
We now state our main technical results, Proposition 3.3, Theorem 3.4. In order, they
solve the following problems:
(1) Given an outcome function g and a single-player type space T , decide if g ∈ IC(T ).
(2) Given single-player type space T 1, T 2, decide if IC(T 1) = IC(T 2).
The characterizations are given based on intrinsic properties of the tropical determinant of
the corresponding type matrices. All of these results play important roles in the proof of
Theorem 1.1.
3.1. Single-player case.
Lemma 3.1. Let g ∈ [m]r. Then g ∈ IC(T ) for some type space T with type matrix
T ∈ Rr×m if and only if the following system of linear inequalities in variables x = (xk) ∈ R
m
and parameters T = (Ti,k) ∈ R
r×m is feasible
(9) Ti,g(i) − xg(i) ≥ Ti,k − xk ∀1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, k 6= g(i).
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In particular, the set of inequalities above is equivalent to
(10) Ti,g(i) − xg(i) ≥ Ti,k − xk ∀1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, k /∈ {g(j) | 1 ≤ j ≤ r}.
Proof. Suppose x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) is a feasible solution of (9). We define a payment function
p : [m] → R by p(j) = xj for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. For any t, s ∈ T , there exists indices 1 ≤ i, j ≤ r
such that Ti = t and Tj = s. Then (3) becomes
Ti,g(i) − xg(i) ≥ Ti,g(j) − xg(j),
which is exactly (9) when taking k = g(j). Conversely, if g ∈ IC(T ), by definition there
exists a payment function p : [m]→ R satisfying (3). Then xj = p(j) gives a solution to the
system (9) and thus it is feasible. Finally, note that for all k not in the range of g, xk can only
appear in the right hand side of (9), thus after assigning values for all other x variables, we
can always assign sufficiently large values to those xk. Hence we may delete all inequalities
involving such k to obtain the linear system (10). 
We would like to characterize the feasibility of linear systems like (10) only by properties
of the entries of the matrix T . To make statements clear (for example Theorem 3.4), in
the following definition we prefer to use the max-plus arithmetic instead of the min-plus
arithmetic.
Definition 3.2 (Tropical determinant of a matrix). The max-plus tropical determinant of a
k×k matrix T is the usual determinant with arithmetic carried out in the max-plus algebra,
that is,
(11) tdet(T ) =
⊕
σ∈Sk
k⊙
j=1
Tj,σ(j) = max
σ∈Sk
k∑
j=1
Tj,σ(j),
where Sk is the permutation group on k letters.
The following result was found by Joswig and Loho [15][Proposition 37]. For completeness
and ease of reference, we restate it here.
Proposition 3.3 ([15]). Let T be a type space with type matrix T ∈ Rr×m and g ∈ [m]r. For
any family I of indices 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < · · · < il ≤ r such that g(i1), g(i2), · · · , g(il) are distinct
elements in [m], there is an l× l minor TI of T with row indices in I and column indices in
J , where jz = g(iz) for 1 ≤ z ≤ l and J = {j1, j2, · · · , jl}. Then g ∈ IC(T ) if and only if for
all such I, the tropical product
l⊙
z=1
Tiz ,jz =
l∑
z=1
Tiz ,jz
is the max-plus tropical determinant of TI .
Theorem 3.4. Let T 1, T 2 be type spaces with type matrix T 1, T 2 ∈ Rr×m, respectively. Then
IC(T 1) = IC(T 2) if and only if for every pair of index sets I ⊆ [r] and J ⊆ [m] with |I| = |J |,
the sets of permutations that attain the max-plus tropical determinant are the same for the
minors T 1I,J and T
2
I,J , where TP,Q denoted the minor of a matrix T with row indices in P and
column indices in Q.
Proof. Suppose T 1I,J and T
2
I,J have the same set of permutations that attain the max-plus
tropical determinant for all such I and J . For any particular g ∈ [m]r, the condition in
Proposition 3.3 either holds for both T 1 and T 2, or does not hold for neither of T 1 and T 2.
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Hence by Proposition 3.3, g ∈ IC(T 1) if and only if g ∈ IC(T 2), and thus IC(T 1) = IC(T 2).
The ”if” part is done.
Conversely, suppose T 1I,J and T
2
I,J do not have the same set of permutations that attain the
max-plus tropical determinant for all such I and J , we need to show that IC(T 1) 6= IC(T 2).
There exists a pair of index sets I = {i1, · · · , il} and J = {j1, · · · , jl} and a permutation on J
such that it corresponds to the max-plus tropical determinant in one of the minors of T 1 and
T 2 but not in the other. We may assume that
∑l
z=1 T
1
iz ,jz
is a max-plus tropical determinant
while
∑l
z=1 T
2
iz ,jz
is not. So there exists a permutation τ on J such that
l∑
z=1
T 2iz ,τ(jz) >
l∑
z=1
T 2iz ,jz .
By Proposition 3.3, for any g ∈ [m]r such that g(iz) = jz for 1 ≤ z ≤ l, g does not belong
to IC(T 2). It suffices to show that there exists such a g that belongs to IC(T 1). We consider
IC(T 1I,J), where TI,J is a type space with type matrix T
1
I,J ∈ R
l×l. Labeling the z-th row
by iz and the z-th column by jz, the the identity permutation always attains the max-plus
tropical determinant for all principal minors of T 1I,J (otherwise we can find a larger value for
tdet
(
T 1I,J
)
, a contradiction). So T 1I,J satisfies the conditions in Proposition 3.3 for g|I . As a
result, there exists real numbers xiz for 1 ≤ z ≤ l such that (9) holds when i ∈ I and k ∈ J .
Now it suffices to define g(i) for i ∈ [r] − I and construct xj for j ∈ [m] − J . For each
i ∈ [r]− I, we let g(i) be an index in J ⊆ [m] such that Ti,g(i)−xg(i) attains the maximum of
the set {(Ti,j − xj) | j ∈ J}. Then our g has range J . As explained after the proof of Lemma
3.1, we just need to check that (10) holds for all i ∈ [r]− I and k ∈ J . Suppose k = jz for
some 1 ≤ z ≤ l, then (10) becomes
Ti,g(i) − xg(i) ≥ Ti,jz − xjz .
This inequality holds by the choice of g(i), and we showed the feasibility of the system
(10). Thus our g ∈ IC(T 1)− IC(T 2), the ”only if” part is done. 
Remark 3.5. Fink and Rincon [13] defined the matching multifield of a matrix, which keeps
track of the set of permutations that achieve the tropical determinant for all maximal minors.
They showed [13, Theorem 4.4] that if IC(T 1) = IC(T 2), then the matching multifields of
T1 and T2 are equal. Theorem 3.4 strengthens this result by showing that the converse holds
when one requires equality not just for maximal minors, but for all minors.
Given a subset V ⊆ [m]r, we would like to find a characterization of all type spaces T with
type matrix T ∈ Rr×m such that IC(T ) = V . For every g ∈ V , we define a family of non-strict
inequalities with variables xgi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) and parameters Ti,j(1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ m)
(12) Ti,g(i) − x
g
g(i) ≥ Ti,k − x
g
k ∀1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, k 6= g(i).
3.2. Multi-player case. For convenience, we also use a r1×r2×· · ·×rn tensor to denote g -
we let its (i1, . . . , in)-th entry be the value g
(
T 1i1 , . . . , T
n
in
)
. For n ≥ 2, [7, Proposition 6.1] gave
a simple characterization for a given tensor to be in IC(T 1, . . . , T n). For self-containment
we recall their results here.
Proposition 3.6. Let T 1, . . . , T n be type spaces with type matrices T 1 ∈ Rr1×m, . . . , T n ∈
R
rn×m. For any g ∈ [m]r1×r2×···×rn, g ∈ IC(T 1, . . . , T n) if and only if for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n and
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any 1 ≤ ik ≤ rk for k 6= j, the function h : [rj ]→ [m] with h(l) = g(i1, i2, . . . , ij−1, l, ij+1, . . . , in)
for 1 ≤ l ≤ rj belongs to IC(T
j).
In particular, when n = 2 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.7. For any matrix g ∈ [m]r1×r2 representing a function [r1] × [r2] → [m] and
two type spaces T 1, T 2, g ∈ IC(T 1, T 2) if and only every column vector of g belongs to T 1
and every row vector of g belongs to T 2.
By replacing the entries Ti,j using (2) in Lemma 3.1, we have the following characterization
for tensors which are affine maximizers.
Lemma 3.8. Let g ∈ [m]r1×···×rn. There exists U1 ∈ Rr1×m, . . . , Un ∈ Rrn×m such that
g ∈ AM(U1, . . . , Un) if and only if the following system in the variables Z, U1, . . . , Un is
feasible:
(13)
n∑
j=1
U j
ij ,g(i1,...,in)
−Zg(i1,...,in) ≥
n∑
j=1
U jij ,k−Zk ∀1 ≤ ij ≤ rj, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, k 6= g(i1, . . . , in).
4. Proofs
The proof of Theorem 1.1 relies on Farkas Lemma, Lemma 3.1 and 3.8 that we introduced
in Section 3. Analyzing the sum of inequalities in cycles, we argue that the nonexistence
of such a pair S1,S2 would imply the nonexistence of T 1, which is a contradiction to our
assumption. The proofs of Theorem 1.2 and 1.3 involve exhibiting specific type spaces where
the claimed statements fail.
4.1. Proof of Theorem 1.1. Fix type space T 1 with type matrix T 1 ∈ Rr1×m and type
space T 2 with type matrix T 2 ∈ Rr2×m and g ∈ [m]r1×r2 such that g ∈ IC(T 1, T 2). To prove
Theorem 1.1, we need to show that there exist type spaces S2 with type matrix S2 ∈ Rr2×m
such that g ∈ AM(T 1,S2). By Lemma 3.8 (when n = 2), it suffices to show that there exist
real numbers S2j,k(1 ≤ j ≤ r2, 1 ≤ k ≤ m) and Zk(1 ≤ k ≤ m) such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ r1, 1 ≤
j ≤ r2, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, we have
(14) T 1i,g(i,j) + S
2
j,g(i,j) − Zg(i,j) ≥ T
1
i,k + S
2
j,k − Zk.
For 1 ≤ j ≤ r2, let g
j be the j-th column vector of g. By Corollary 3.7, since g ∈
IC(T 1, T 2), every gj ∈ IC(T 1). By (12), there exist corresponding vectors xj ∈ Rm such that
for 1 ≤ i ≤ r1, 1 ≤ j ≤ r2, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, we have (note that the i-th entry of g
j is just g(i, j))
(15) T 1i,g(i,j) − x
j
g(i,j) ≥ T
1
i,k − x
j
k.
Now for 1 ≤ j ≤ r2, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, we let S
2
j,k = −x
j
k and Zk = 0. Then S
2
j,g(i,j) = −x
j
g(i,j),
and (14) becomes
T 1i,g(i,j) − x
j
g(i,j) ≥ T
1
i,k − x
j
k,
which is exactly (15). So our choice of S2 and Z satisfy (14), and Theorem 1.1 is proved.
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4.2. Proof of Theorem 1.2(i). To prove Theorem 1.2(i), we shall construct an explicit
type space T = T 1 × T 2 × T 3 on three players and an IC mechanism g on T such that for
any type space S = S1 × S2 × S3, g ∈ AM(S1,S2,S3) and IC(T 1) = IC(S1) cannot happen
simultaneously. Let r1 = r2 = r3 = 2 and m = 6. Define g ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 6}
2×2×2 as
g(1, 1, 1) = 1, g(1, 1, 2) = 3, g(1, 2, 1) = 4, g(1, 2, 2) = 1,
g(2, 1, 1) = 5, g(2, 1, 2) = 2, g(2, 2, 1) = 2, g(2, 2, 2) = 6.
Define T 1, T 2, T 3 to be the set of the column vectors of the following matrices
T 1 =
[
3 4 5 6 2 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
]
, T 2 =
[
5 2 3 6 4 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
]
, T 3 =
[
5 2 6 3 4 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
]
.
We verify that g ∈ IC(T 1, T 2, T 3) by checking that the column vectors of corresponding
flattenings of g belong to IC(T i), where i = 1, 2, 3.
(1, 5), (3, 2), (4, 2), (1, 6) ∈ IC(T 1);
(1, 3), (4, 1), (5, 2), (2, 6) ∈ IC(T 2);
(1, 4), (3, 1), (5, 2), (2, 6) ∈ IC(T 3).
Now, suppose g ∈ AM(S1,S2,S3) for some type space S = S1 × S2 × S3, each Si repre-
sented by the 2× 2 matrix Si. By Lemma 3.8, this holds if and only if the following system
of linear inequalities in variable z is feasible:
S1i1,g(i1,i2,i3) + S
2
i1,g(i1,i2,i3)
+ S3i1,g(i1,i2,i3) − zg(i1,i2,i3) ≥ S
1
i1,k
+ S2i2,k + S
3
i3,k
− zk,
where the indices run over all i1, i2, i3, k such that 1 ≤ i1, i2, i3 ≤ 2, 1 ≤ k ≤ 6, k 6= g(i1, i2, i3).
In particular, we have
S11,1 + S
2
1,1 + S
3
1,1 − z1 ≥ S
1
1,2 + S
2
1,2 + S
3
1,2 − z2 [(i1, i2, i3, k) = (1, 1, 1, 2)];
S11,1 + S
2
2,1 + S
3
2,1 − z1 ≥ S
1
1,2 + S
2
2,2 + S
3
2,2 − z2 [(i1, i2, i3, k) = (1, 2, 2, 2)];
S12,2 + S
2
1,2 + S
3
2,2 − z2 ≥ S
1
2,1 + S
2
1,1 + S
3
2,1 − z1 [(i1, i2, i3, k) = (2, 1, 2, 1)];
S12,2 + S
2
2,2 + S
3
1,2 − z2 ≥ S
1
2,1 + S
2
2,1 + S
3
1,1 − z1 [(i1, i2, i3, k) = (2, 2, 1, 1)].
(16)
Summing over the four inequalities in (16), we get
S11,1 + S
1
2,2 ≥ S
1
1,2 + S
1
2,1.
Now suppose that in addition, IC(S1) = IC(T 1). Since the max-plus tropical determinant
of T 1{1,2},{1,2} is only attained by T
1
1,1 + T
1
2,2, by Theorem 3.4 we also have
(17) S11,1 + S
1
2,2 > S
1
1,2 + S
1
2,1.
However, (2, 1) ∈ IC(T 1) = IC(S1), which implies that there exist X1, X2 ∈ R such that
S11,2 −X2 ≥ S
1
1,1 −X1; S
1
2,1 −X1 ≥ S
1
2,2 −X2.
Summing up these two inequalities to eliminate X1, X2, we obtain
S11,2 + S
1
2,1 ≥ S
1
1,1 + S
1
2,2,
but this contradicts (17). Hence g ∈ AM(S1,S2,S3) and IC(T 1) = IC(S1) cannot happen
simultaneously.
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4.3. Proof of Theorem 1.2(ii). To prove Theorem 1.2(ii), we construct an explicit type
space T = T 1×T 2 and an IC mechanism g on T such that for any type space S = S1×S2,
g ∈ AM(S1,S2), IC(S1) = IC(T 1) and IC(S2) = IC(T 2) cannot happen simultaneously. Let
r1 = r2 = 2 and m = 4. Define
T 1 =
[
13 46 9 11
45 47 1 24
]
, T 2 =
[
12 8 19 38
28 46 19 4
]
, g =
[
4 3
1 2
]
.
And we let T i be the type spaces with type matrix T i for i = 1, 2. We have that
IC(T 1) = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 4), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (4, 1), (4, 4)}
IC(T 2) = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3), (4, 1), (4, 2), (4, 3), (4, 4)},
so g ∈ IC(T 1, T 2). Now, suppose for contradiction that there exists a type space S = S1×S2
that satisfy all three conditions. Since IC(S1) = IC(T 1) and T 11,2 + T
1
2,4 = 46 + 24 = 70 >
58 = 11 + 47 = T 11,4 + T
1
2,2, by Theorem 3.4 we also have
(18) S11,2 + S
1
2,4 > S
1
1,4 + S
1
2,2.
Since IC(S2) = IC(T 2) and T 21,3 + T
2
2,1 = 19 + 28 > 12 + 19 = T
2
1,1 + T
2
2,3, by Theorem 3.4
we also have
(19) S21,3 + S
2
2,1 > S
2
1,1 + S
2
2,3.
Note that IC(S1) = IC(αS1) for all positive α > 0, one may assume that the constants
α1, α2 in the affine maximizer equal to one. Since g ∈ AM(S
1,S2) with constants α1 = α2 = 1,
by Lemma 3.8 we can find Z ∈ R4 such that
S11,4 + S
2
1,4 − Z4 ≥ S
1
1,3 + S
2
1,3 − Z3
S11,3 + S
2
2,3 − Z3 ≥ S
1
1,2 + S
2
2,2 − Z2
S12,1 + S
2
1,1 − Z1 ≥ S
1
2,4 + S
2
1,4 − Z4
S12,2 + S
2
2,2 − Z2 ≥ S
1
2,1 + S
2
2,1 − Z1
(20)
Summing over all inequalities (18), (19) and (20), we have 0 > 0, a contradiction.
4.4. Proof of Theorem 1.2(iii). Let m = 3, n = 2 and r1 = r2 = 2. Define
T 1 =
[
0 1 3
0 2 1
]
, T 2 =
[
0 4 2
0 2 0
]
, g1 =
[
2 3
2 1
]
, g2 =
[
3 1
3 2
]
.
And let T 1, T 2 be the type spaces with type matrices T 1, T 2 respectively. We have
IC(T 1) = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3)}
IC(T 2) = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3)}.
By Corollary 3.7, g1, g2 ∈ IC(T 1, T 2). To prove Theorem 1.2(iii), we need to show that
there do not exist S1,S2 with type matrices S1, S2 ∈ R2×3 such that g1, g2 ∈ AM(S1,S2)
and IC(S1) = IC(T 1). Suppose for contradiction that such S1,S2 exist. By definition, there
exist positive constants α1, α2, β1, β2 such that g
1 ∈ IC(α1S
1, α2S
2) and g2 ∈ IC(β1S
1, β2S
2).
Then there exist Y, Z ∈ R3 such that for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2, 1 ≤ p ≤ 3,
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α1S
1
i,g1(i,j) + α2S
2
j,g1(i,j) − Yg1(i,j) ≥ α1S
1
i,p + α2S
2
j,p − Yp;
β1S
1
i,g2(i,j) + β2S
2
j,g2(i,j) − Zg2(i,j) ≥ β1S
1
i,p + β2S
2
j,p − Zp.
Hence we have the following inequalities:
α1S
1
1,2 + α2S
2
1,2 − Y2 ≥ α1S
1
1,3 + α2S
2
1,3 − Y3 [(i, j, g
1(i, j), p) = (1, 1, 2, 3)];
α1S
1
1,3 + α2S
2
2,3 − Y3 ≥ α1S
1
1,1 + α2S
2
2,1 − Y1 [(i, j, g
1(i, j), p) = (1, 2, 3, 1)];
α1S
1
2,1 + α2S
2
2,1 − Y1 ≥ α1S
1
2,2 + α2S
2
2,2 − Y2 [(i, j, g
2(i, j), p) = (2, 2, 1, 2)]
(21)
and
β1S
1
1,1 + β2S
2
2,1 − Z1 ≥ β1S
1
1,3 + β2S
2
2,3 − Z3 [(i, j, g
2(i, j), p) = (1, 2, 1, 3)];(22)
β1S
1
2,3 + β2S
2
1,3 − Z3 ≥ β1S
1
2,2 + β2S
2
1,2 − Z2 [(i, j, g
2(i, j), p) = (2, 1, 3, 2)];(23)
β1S
1
2,2 + β2S
2
2,2 − Z2 ≥ β1S
1
2,1 + β2S
2
2,1 − Z1 [(i, j, g
2(i, j), p) = (2, 2, 2, 1)];(24)
β1S
1
2,2 + β2S
2
2,2 − Z2 ≥ β1S
1
2,3 + β2S
2
2,3 − Z3 [(i, j, g
2(i, j), p) = (2, 2, 2, 3)].(25)
Summing over the inequalities in (21), we get
(26) α1 ·
[
S11,2 + S
1
2,1 − S
1
1,1 − S
1
2,2
]
+ α2 ·
[
S21,2 + S
2
2,3 − S
2
1,3 − S
2
2,1
]
≥ 0.
Add up equations (22),(23) and (24), we get
(27) β1 ·
[
S11,1 + S
1
2,3 − S
1
1,3 − S
1
2,1
]
+ β2 ·
[
S21,3 + S
2
2,2 − S
2
1,2 − S
2
2,3
]
≥ 0.
Add up (23) and (25), divide by β2 > 0, we get
(28) S21,3 + S
2
2,2 − S
2
1,2 − S
2
2,3 ≥ 0.
Note that IC(S1) = IC(T 1) and
T 11,1 + T
1
2,2 = 0 + 2 > 1 + 0 = T
1
1,2 − T
1
2,1;(29)
T 11,3 + T
1
2,2 = 3 + 2 > 1 + 1 = T
1
1,2 − T
1
2,3,(30)
by Theorem 3.4, we also have
S11,1 + S
1
2,2 − S
1
1,2 − S
1
2,1 > 0,(31)
S11,3 + S
1
2,2 − S
1
1,2 − S
1
2,3 > 0.(32)
Now if α1β2 ≥ α2β1, then we take the sum
α2β1 · (32) + (α1β2 − α2β1) · (31) + β2 · (26) + α2 · (27),
which is a R≥0-linear combination of these inequalities, and its LHS vanishes. Since (32) is
a strict inequality and α2β1 > 0, it implies 0 > 0, a contradiction!
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Similarly, if α1β2 < α2β1, then we take the sum
α1β1 · (32) + (α2β1 − α1β2) · (28) + β1 · (26) + α1 · (27),
which is a R+-linear combination of these inequalities, and its LHS vanishes too. Since (32)
is a strict inequality and α1β1 > 0, it implies 0 > 0, a contradiction, too! So in either cases
there is a contradiction, and such a pair of S1,S2 does not exist.
4.5. Proof of Theorem 1.3. We consider a type space T = T 1×T 1, here the type matrix
corresponding to T 1 is
T 1 =

0 5 60 0 3
0 4 0

 .
In addition we let
g =

2 3 23 3 1
2 1 1

 .
Then
IC(T 1) ={(1, 1, 1), (2, 1, 1), (2, 1, 2), (2, 2, 2), (2, 3, 2),
(3, 1, 1), (3, 1, 2), (3, 3, 1), (3, 3, 2), (3, 3, 3)},
by Corollary 3.7, g ∈ IC(T 1, T 1). However, there is no type space S with 3× 3 type matrix
S such that g ∈ AM(S,S) and IC(S) = IC(T ). Indeed, suppose for contradiction that such
S exists. One may assume that α1 = α2 = 1. In addition, (3, 1, 2) ∈ IC(T ) = IC(S) (this
cell type (3, 1, 2) corresponds to the unique shaded cell in the right picture of Figure 2). So
for any Y ∈ R3 in the interior of that cell, by (9) we have
S1,3 − Y3 > S1,k − Yk ∀k = 1, 2;
S2,1 − Y1 > S2,k − Yk ∀k = 2, 3;
S3,2 − Y2 > S3,k − Yk ∀k = 1, 3.
Since g ∈ AM(S,S) with constants α1 = α2 = 1, by Lemma 3.8 there exists Z ∈ R
3 such
that
Si,g(i,j) + Sj,g(i,j) − Zg(i,j) ≥ Si,k + Sj,k − Zk ∀1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ 3, k 6= g(i, j).
So we have the following inequalities
2(S1,3 − Y3) > 2(S1,2 − Y2)
2(S2,1 − Y1) > 2(S2,3 − Y3)
2(S3,2 − Y2) > 2(S3,1 − Y1)
2S1,2 − Z2 ≥ 2S1,3 − Z3 [(i, j, k) = (1, 1, 3)]
2S2,3 − Z3 ≥ 2S2,1 − Z1 [(i, j, k) = (2, 2, 1)]
2S3,1 − Z1 ≥ 2S3,2 − Z2 [(i, j, k) = (3, 3, 2)]
(33)
Summing over the inequalities in (33), we obtain the desired contradiction 0 > 0.
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5. Summary
In this paper, we take a novel view of the classical Roberts’ Theorem and ask if a given
mechanism can be turned into an affine maximizer on an equivalent type space. We give an
affirmative result in this direction, Theorem 1.1, which applies to all finite type spaces on two-
player games. Through a series of counterexamples, we show that our theorems are strongest
possible in this general setup. Our proof technique utilizes insights from tropical geometry,
and raises a number of questions of interest to both economists and tropical geometers.
The second open question is whether our theorems hold for continuous type spaces. One
reason to pursue this question is to obtain a novel alternative proof of the original Roberts’
Theorem that is distinct from the analysis-based techniques in the current literature, and to
make our results easier to compare with the others on this topic. While compact type spaces
can be approximated by discretization, and a number of tropical geometric results still hold
in the limit [7], the dimensions of the matrices involved become infinite. In particular, one
then has an infinite system of inequalities and variables, and thus the techniques applied in
our paper no longer hold, presenting a significant challenge. For type spaces such as Rn, the
set of IC outcome functions completely determines the type space. Thus, a starting point for
this open question would be: for what set of type spaces do the set of IC outcome functions
completely determines the type space, and does Theorem 1.1 hold in those cases?
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